

# Sudan and South Sudan

## Violence trajectories after peace agreements

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Peace agreements can be turning points in complex transitions from war to peace. But they don't necessarily lead to greater stability, let alone peace. This report explores trajectories of violence in Sudan and South Sudan after the signature of peace agreements. It traces violence trajectories and explores whether these peace agreements resolved, reshaped or perpetuated existing patterns of violence.

## Key findings

- ▶ Despite ambitious peace interventions, Sudan and South Sudan are among the countries in Africa to have experienced the highest number of fatalities between 2011 and 2017.
- ▶ The lead-up to, and the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 in Sudan, saw a dramatic decline in armed conflict activity and fatalities which stresses the conflict transforming impact of the peace process.
- ▶ About six years of ‘negative peace’ followed the CPA, before armed conflict was revived in the lead-up to South Sudan’s independence on 9 July 2011.
- ▶ Exclusion from the peace process perpetuated existing grievances in Darfur and fueled political violence.
- ▶ The CPA didn’t incentivise fundamental changes to Sudan’s political order. Instead, it reinforced a pattern of political violence in which Khartoum crushes all political opposition with force.
- ▶ The 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) provision of a unity government to be followed by elections in a ‘winner-takes-all’ context compounded incentives for political violence.
- ▶ It reinforced a political order based on violent competition for power and resources.
- ▶ After the ARCSS collapse, political violence spread across South Sudan.
- ▶ Violence against civilians increased in the aftermath of the ARCSS in South Sudan.
- ▶ Overall, both the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP GED) affirm each other’s findings with regard to the trends in political violence in Sudan after the CPA and in South Sudan after the ARCSS.

## Recommendations

- ▶ Peace and dialogue processes need to carefully consider the trade-offs of who is included and who is excluded from the talks. In Sudan and South Sudan, exclusion perpetuated existing grievances and led to violence.
- ▶ Understanding how to engage in multi-level peace and dialogue processes is vital in multi-layered conflict environments such as Sudan and South Sudan. This includes addressing intra-rebel group disputes, intra-group and local conflict, and the strategic use of violence against civilians.
- ▶ Peace agreements and subsequent implementation efforts must ensure the protection of civilians, including from state forces.
- ▶ The risks of introducing elections for states that emerge from war and that lack a secure monopoly of violence need to be better assessed.
- ▶ The structural drivers of violence and instability cannot be ignored. If left unaddressed or traded off against geopolitics and/or short term stability, they are likely to spoil efforts to build peace in the medium and longer terms.
- ▶ Geographically disaggregated conflict event data can improve policymaker’s understanding of complex conflict environments and inform the design of peace and dialogue processes.

## Introduction

In sub-Saharan Africa, negotiated peace processes are common practice to resolve violent conflicts, in particular civil wars. Peace agreements are an important component of such processes.

The United Nations and World Bank report *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict* defines peace agreements as political settlements that seek to ‘manage the risk of violence and reach some form of stability’.<sup>1</sup> A political settlement is understood as ‘an explicit or an implicit bargain among elites over the distribution of rights and entitlements’.<sup>2</sup>

Peace agreements can be turning points in inherently complex transitions from war to peace. However, they are essentially ‘words on paper that need to be implemented’ or ‘aspirational road maps for the path the peace process will continue along’.<sup>3</sup> This is why they do not necessarily lead to greater stability or security let alone ‘positive peace’<sup>4</sup> in the longer term. In fact, many post-war societies resemble ‘neither war nor peace’ situations<sup>5</sup> that are characterised by ‘recurrence of violence, absence of security, and political stalemate’.<sup>6</sup>

Reorganising power among conflict actors can resolve grievances, but it can also create new ones ‘as the perpetrators of atrocities gain positions of power and influence over government affairs’ or ‘create incentives for new actors to take up arms’.<sup>7</sup>

Sudan’s 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) formally ended one of Africa’s longest and most violent wars. But it left several other conflict systems unaddressed, most prominently in Darfur, and by laying the foundations for an independent South Sudan it arguably created new fault lines.

In South Sudan the externally brokered peace agreement from 2015 collapsed in less than a year and civil war recurred. The parties had only reluctantly committed to the deal, which compromised implementation of the provisions included in the agreement.<sup>8</sup>

Implementation plays an important role in the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of peace agreements, both in the short and longer terms.

Madhav Joshi and Jason Quinn provide quantitative evidence that ‘the strongest predictor of whether the signatories of a CPA will return to civil war (or not) is the overall extent that the provisions that were negotiated were subsequently implemented’.

They also find that the benefits of implementation go beyond signatories and include factions outside of the peace process. That is, ‘viable implementation processes pull outside actors in, while failing implementation processes push inside actors out, generating greater overall levels of future civil war’.<sup>9</sup>

This report points to some of these complexities by exploring trends in organised political violence after the signing of the CPA<sup>10</sup> between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) on 9 January 2005, and the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) on 17 August 2015 between the Government of South Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO).

Peace agreements can be turning points in complex transitions from war to peace

It asks whether these peace agreements resolved, reshaped or perpetuated existing patterns of violence.

For this purpose, the analysis uses conflict data from two leading conflict event datasets, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED)<sup>11</sup> and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP GED).<sup>12</sup>

## Scope and methodology

Open-source conflict data is increasingly used to analyse trends and patterns in political instability across and within countries over time.<sup>13</sup> The African Futures and Innovation Programme at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) has incorporated conflict data into its research on conflict and violence trends in Africa for several years.<sup>14</sup>

This report builds on that body of work. It focuses on Sudan and South Sudan, which are priority countries for the Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP) funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID).<sup>15</sup> Despite a track record of ambitious and complex peace interventions, Sudan and South Sudan are among the countries in Africa that experienced the highest number of fatalities between 2011 and 2017 (Figure 1).

Sudan has a history of protracted violence which is largely a legacy of how it was (mis)ruled during colonialism. Its conflict systems can sometimes be concentrated in typically resource-rich areas (southern Sudan in 2010), and at other times be characterised by a diffusion of violence to more of its territory (e.g. Darfur in 2003 and South Sudan in 2013).<sup>16</sup>

Both Sudan and South Sudan experienced negotiated peace processes that at some stage led to the signing of peace agreements.<sup>17</sup> In both cases, external actors played and continue to play a crucial role.<sup>18</sup> Both


countries have been laboratories for ambitious and complex peace interventions.

This report uses conflict event data<sup>20</sup> from ACLED and UCDP GED to explore temporally and geographically disaggregated trends in organised political violence after the signing of peace agreements in Sudan and South Sudan. It considers the conflict intensity measured in number of events and fatalities, the type of conflict, conflict actors and locations until December 2017.

The analysis in this report presents the data for the Darfur conflict separately because the CPA was exclusively focused on resolving the war between the north and the south. Nevertheless, the CPA affected the evolution of the conflict in Darfur.

Both ACLED and UCDP GED are large-scale data-collection projects that produce georeferenced, disaggregated event conflict data. Overall, they have contributed to a more nuanced understanding of organised political violence, but they also have limitations.<sup>21</sup>

**Figure 1: Countries in Africa with the highest fatality rates from armed conflict versus rest of Africa, 2011 to 2017**



Source: UCDP GED Global Edition version 18.1, adapted from J Cilliers.<sup>19</sup>

These mostly refer to the quality of data which reflects the availability and the quality of information/sources as well as access to it. Both rely heavily on media sources and complement their data collection with other sources, such as UN, local and international NGO reports, truth and reconciliation commission reports, WikiLeaks documents, etc.

Media reports can of course be incomplete and politically biased, and more so in contexts where media freedom is constrained. The extremely fluid reality of conflict in South Sudan makes it a particularly challenging environment for data collection. Limitations also refer to coding practices and quality-control mechanisms.<sup>22</sup>

The analysis in this report focuses on broader trends and is not intended to convey a comprehensive (micro-level) picture of organised political violence in Sudan and South Sudan.<sup>23</sup>

Despite some key differences, ACLED and UCDP GED datasets are sufficiently comparable for the broader violence trend and pattern analysis in this report (Box 1). ACLED uses a much broader definition of political violence than UCDP GED and does not apply a fatality threshold,<sup>24</sup> which explains why ACLED typically records more conflict events than UCDP GED.

The report also draws on data and analysis on implementation of peace agreements collected by the

### Box 1: ACLED and UCDP GED definitions

ACLED understands political violence as ‘the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation’. It defines political violence ‘through its constituent events, and a politically violent event is a single altercation where force is used by one or more groups for a political end’.<sup>25</sup> ACLED also records non-fatal and non-violent events (arrests, troop movements, protests, etc.), but this report only considers battles, violence against civilians and remote violence.<sup>26</sup>

A battle event is defined as a violent interaction between two politically organised armed groups at a particular time and location. Typically these interactions occur between government militaries/militias and rebel groups/factions within the context of a civil war. However, they also include militia violence, rebel-on-rebel violence and military-on-military violence.<sup>27</sup>

Violence against civilians is defined as armed/violent group attacks on civilians. By definition, civilians are unarmed and not engaged in political violence. Rebels, governments, militias and rioters can all commit violence against civilians.

ACLED’s actor types include military forces, rebel forces,<sup>30</sup> political militias and ethnic militias.<sup>29</sup>

UCDP GED defines an event as ‘an incident where armed force was used by an organized actor against another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least 1 direct death at a specific location and a specific date’.<sup>30</sup>

Only events linkable to a UCDP/ Peace Research Institute Oslo armed conflict, a UCDP non-state conflict or a UCDP one-sided violence instance are included.<sup>31</sup> This also means that some groups that commit relevant acts of violence may not be included because they lack a clear incompatibility with a conflict actor or do not pass the 25-battle-related threshold to be included in the yearly data.

The UCDP defines a state-based armed conflict as a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.

A non-state conflict is defined as the use of armed force between two organised armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. One-sided violence is defined as the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians that results in at least 25 deaths in a year.<sup>32</sup>

UCDP GED does not code for actor types.

ACLED events are coded by day<sup>33</sup> while UCDP GED captures the time span of an event. Definitions aside, this means that ACLED typically records more events than UCDP GED.

Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (Kroc Institute) for their Peace Accords Matrix (PAM)<sup>34</sup> as well as on the PA-X Peace Agreements Database developed by the University of Edinburgh (PA-X) (Annex).<sup>35</sup>

The report first discusses Sudan and then South Sudan.

## Sudan

### Brief conflict history and peace agreement

Sudan's armed conflict landscape is highly complex and has been described as 'a civil war of "interlocking civil wars"' with a series of 'interwoven causes', including economic, resource-based, ethnic, cultural, religious and international factors.<sup>36</sup> These causes are all 'underpinned by the state's crisis of legitimacy and its utility as a vehicle for economic exploitation'.<sup>37</sup>

Sudan's governance structure is controlled by a small group of elites that 'command strategic resources and preside over the state in ways that produce conflict with major societal groups'.<sup>38</sup> Since independence in 1956, these elites at the centre 'have negotiated effective bargains' with regional and local elites and rebels to ensure 'the political survival of the old established autocracy'.<sup>39</sup> This has involved lower or higher levels of violence at different points in time.

Dynamics of marginalisation lie at the centre of Sudan's complex conflict landscape

Between 1983 and 2005, in what is known as the Second Sudanese Civil War, the Khartoum-based government of Sudan fought a war against rebel groups in the south, of which the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was the most consolidated group. They fought over power and resources, the role of religion in the state, and self-determination.<sup>40</sup> An estimated two million people were killed as a result of violence, famine and disease.<sup>41</sup>

Marginalisation was not exclusive to the south but also characteristic of armed conflict between the government of Sudan and elements of the Beja in the east, the Fur in Darfur, the Nuba in Kordofan and many others.<sup>42</sup>

In fact, armed conflict broke out in Darfur in 2003, when the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) started an armed rebellion against Khartoum. Since then, fighting has caused huge numbers of fatalities, including civilians.

In January 2005, after years of intense negotiations, the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the SPLM/A signed the CPA, also known as the Naivasha Agreement.<sup>43</sup>

The CPA agreement was brokered by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and a Troika consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway. It was preceded by four ceasefire agreements that were entered into in January 2002, October 2002, February 2003 and December 2004.

Sudan's CPA formally ended one of Africa's longest and most violent wars

The CPA included provisions for political, territorial, military and economic power-sharing. It established a seven-year transition period with the formation of a Government of National Unity in Khartoum and a semi-autonomous Government of South Sudan.

It delineated a north-south boundary and included a secession referendum for the south to be held in 2011. Under the military power-sharing provision the deal called for the integration of all armed forces and other armed groups into either the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) or the SPLA, the creation of joint integrated units between the two armies, and the redeployment of both forces to their respective sides of the north-south border. Finally, the CPA provided for an even split of oil revenues between the north and the south with a 2% share allocated to oil-producing states.<sup>44</sup>

The CPA also included provisions for the administration of three contested areas (Abyei, Southern Kordofan/ Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile) and a UN peacekeeping monitoring mission. Under a new constitution that emerged from the CPA, national elections were to be held in 2009, followed by a referendum on the independence of South Sudan in 2011.<sup>45</sup>

Map 1: Sudan



Source: United Nations, October 2007 (modified to include eventual border with South Sudan).

**Trajectories of violence**

The years preceding the signing of the CPA were characterised by intense negotiations and several more or less successful ceasefires between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A.

The January 2002 ceasefire<sup>46</sup> regarding the Nuba Mountains in Southern Kordofan, one of the contested areas on the border between northern and southern Sudan, was considered a breakthrough in the peace process which until then had seen very limited progress.


However, data from both ACLED and UCDP GED show that this ceasefire did not lead to a sustained reduction in conflict activity and fatalities.

An initial drop in fatalities was followed by an increase in the number of conflict events as well as a gradual increase in the number of fatalities to pre-ceasefire levels and above (Figures 2 and 3).



FOUR CEASEFIRES  
PRECEDED THE SIGNATURE  
OF THE CPA

**Figure 2: Number of conflict events and fatalities in Sudan (excluding Darfur), January 2001 to January 2005 (ACLED)**



Source: ACLED, version 8.

Overall conflict activity remained high albeit with fluctuations. The data points to two peaks in fatalities (over 2 000 in July 2002 and over 3 000 in September 2002) that by far exceeded pre-ceasefire levels. The ceasefire that followed in October 2002<sup>47</sup> led to a longer-lasting decline in violent events and fatalities, and a third ceasefire in February 2003<sup>48</sup> bolstered this trend.


UCDP GED recorded no events in subsequent months. However, by the end of 2003 levels of violence increased, although at fatality levels roughly comparable to average levels before the January 2002 ceasefire but significantly lower than in July 2002 and September 2002 respectively.

Even though ACLED consistently records more conflict events and higher reported fatalities than UCDP GED, both datasets point to the same trend of a gradual reduction in both the number of events and fatalities between January 2002 and January 2005.

In fact, the number of conflict events as well as the number of fatalities declined sharply in anticipation of the CPA in January 2005, which had also brought into effect another ceasefire that had been signed in December 2004.<sup>49</sup>

The signing of the peace deal was followed by a dramatic decline in armed conflict activity in Sudan. In essence, the deal accommodated the main rebel actor SPLM/A in

**Figure 3: Number of conflict events and fatalities in Sudan (excluding Darfur), January 2001 to January 2005 (UCDP GED)**



Source: UCDP GED, version 18.1.

Sudan's political settlement. This minimised the fighting between government forces and the SPLM/A and translated into a period of relatively low and stable levels of violence that lasted for about six years (until 2011) (Figures 4 and 5).


More specifically, the number of battle events (ACLED) or state-based violence (UCDP GED) between government forces and the SPLM/A drastically declined. UCDP GED doesn't record any conflict activity associated with the SPLM/A since the run-up to the CPA, and ACLED records only a few incidents.<sup>50</sup>

Arguably the presence of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) since March 2005 helped with the

implementation of the CPA provisions, in particular the ceasefire monitoring and verification.<sup>51</sup>

Moreover, the Juba Declaration signed in January 2006 played a key role in the reduction of overall conflict activity in Sudan in the immediate post-CPA period in that it addressed the reality of some of the smaller armed groups, an issue that had been left unresolved by the CPA. The declaration was signed by the first vice president of Sudan Salva Kiir Mayardit and General Paulino Matip Nhial, the leader of the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), an anti-SPLA southern rebel alliance that had provided security for the SAF garrisons and for oil

**Figure 4: Number of conflict events and fatalities in Sudan (excluding Darfur), January 2002 to June 2011 (ACLED)**



Source: ACLED, version 8.

fields in the north of South Sudan in exchange for arms and ammunition.

However there were some notable exceptions to the period of relative stability that characterised the run-up to as well as the aftermath of the CPA. These included heavy fighting between elements of the SAF and SPLA rebels in Malakal in November 2006, in the contested Abyei area on the border of south and north Sudan in May 2008, and between a Khartoum-affiliated militia and SPLA rebels in Malakal again in February 2009.<sup>52</sup>


ACLED data shows that from 2004 in the lead-up to the CPA as well as in the three years after the signature of the peace deal roughly half of conflict events (comprising battles, remote violence and violence against civilians) were directed against civilians (Figure 6).

Overall, UCDP GED data corroborates this finding. Already in 2003, one-sided violence accounted for more than half of overall violence during this period although there is greater fluctuation between the years (Figure 7).

Disaggregated by conflict actor, it is apparent that these events were mainly perpetrated by the Ugandan rebel group the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in southern Sudan (Map 2). There were also numerous clashes involving other armed groups in the Upper Nile since the end of 2005.<sup>53</sup>


According to ACLED, reported events of violence against civilians increased from 2008 to 2017 with some fluctuations during this period. In 2009, the data reflects a significant increase in violence against civilians which accounted for more than 60 per cent of overall conflict activity in that year. According to ACLED analysis, this

**Figure 5: Number of conflict events and fatalities in Sudan (excluding Darfur), January 2002 to June 2011 (UCDP GED)**




Source: UCDP GED, version 18.1.

**Figure 6: Share of overall violence per event type in Sudan (excluding Darfur), 2001–2011 (ACLED)**



Source: ACLED, version 8.

**Figure 7: Share of overall violence per event type in Sudan (excluding Darfur), 2011–2011 (UCDP GED)**



Source: UCDP GED, version 18.1.

reflects ‘the strategic use of civilian targeting as part of political conflict activity’. The UCDP GED dataset shows a significant increase in both one-sided as well as non-state violence in 2009.

The CPA’s provision for all parties to disarm, repatriate or expel foreign insurgency groups from Sudan as soon as possible was not implemented as efforts to expel the LRA largely failed.<sup>54</sup> The rebel group severely disrupted the peace process in southern Sudan. By the end of 2008, the LRA eventually moved most of its forces to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).<sup>55</sup>

After the signature of the CPA, the conflict parties continued to wage low-intensity war via proxies

The LRA was backed by the Khartoum government in retaliation for Uganda’s support of the SPLM/A. The case of the LRA’s activity in southern Sudan illustrates that despite limited fighting between government forces and the SPLM/A in the aftermath of the CPA, the two parties relied on proxies in both northern and southern Sudan to wage low-intensity war.

The south backed Darfuri rebel groups, and after South Sudan’s independence in 2011 it supported the Sudan

People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), a splinter from the SPLM). The Sudanese government, on the other hand, supported several rebellions in the south.

While the ceasefire was largely respected by the parties, the CPA’s provisions regarding redeployment of troops and the formation of joint integrated units (JIUs) were either implemented with delays, not implemented or violated, in particular in contested areas such as Abyei, Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile.<sup>56</sup> In addition, both parties disrespected the provision to not replenish arms.<sup>57</sup>

ACLED data also points to an increase in the share of conflict events perpetrated by militias in the three years after the CPA was signed; another indicator for the mutation of the war to lower-intensity fighting via proxies during the immediate post-CPA period. In fact, according to ACLED analysis, ‘conflict involving ethnic and communal militias increased dramatically after 2005’, and ‘communal groups are increasingly involved in battles’ causing high numbers of fatalities.<sup>58</sup>

### Revived conflict

Towards the end of the 2000s, armed conflict was revived in the lead-up to South Sudan’s independence on 9 July 2011. South Sudan’s independence also meant the completion of the interim period as established by the CPA and therefore the end of the UNMIS mandate and presence.

## Box 2: The CPA and Darfur

The CPA addressed the conflict between northern and southern Sudan, excluding other conflict systems in Sudan. Some argue that the exclusion of Darfur in particular prompted Darfuri rebels to launch their insurgency, as this seemed the only way to ‘win’ a place at the negotiation table and challenge the concentration of power at the centre.<sup>59</sup>

Atta el-Battahani writes that framing the peace process and eventually the agreement as taking place between ‘a unified north and a unified south’ alienated ‘those who felt marginalised by their rulers and emboldened them to take up arms’ and that ‘these sentiments are a significant contributor to the outbreak of war in Darfur in early 2003’.<sup>60</sup>


The data supports this view as the insurgency in Darfur effectively broke out during the height of the peace

process when power was being redistributed (although it is not possible to establish causality) (Figures 8 and 9). In other words, only the actors who had resorted to violence to pursue their objectives were being considered.

In 2004, ACLED recorded over 8 500 fatalities in Darfur caused by 439 conflict events, predominantly violence against civilians. In the same year, UCDP GED recorded approximately 6 000 reported fatalities in Darfur, of which over 50% were civilians.


These fatality counts for Darfur contrast sharply with the much lower reported fatality count for 2004 in the rest of Sudan which stood at 2 833 and 1 259 as recorded by ACLED and UCDP GED respectively.

**Figure 8: Number of conflict events and fatalities in Darfur, 2000 to 2017 (ACLED)**




Source: ACLED, version 8.

**Figure 9: Number of conflict events and fatalities in Darfur, 2000 to 2017 (UCDP GED)**



Source: UCDP GED, version 18.1.

**Figure 10: Number of conflict events and fatalities in Sudan (excluding Darfur), January 2008 to December 2017 (ACLED)**



Source: ACLED, version 8.

Both datasets reflect a considerable increase in the frequency of conflict events in Sudan between the end of the 2000s and 2016 (Figures 10 and 11) compared to the period of relatively low conflict activity in the years immediately before as well as after the CPA.

The period of relative stability lasted until the end of the 2000s when conflict activity started to increase again

Nevertheless, overall conflict activity fluctuated (possibly in line with the onset of the rainy and dry seasons), and on average it was lower than during the period of the civil war captured by the data. During 2017, ACLED


data points to a significant reduction in the number of conflict events.

UCDP GED data shows a similar trend, but overall it depicts much lower levels of violence than ACLED.

In 2011, and according to ACLED, more than half of conflict events were battles, followed by violence against civilians (close to 40%) and remote violence (about 10%). UCDP GED data corroborates this, reflecting a predominance of state-based and one-sided violence in the same year. Data from UCDP GED indicates that fatalities from these events were at generally lower levels than before 2003.

It was fighting the SPLM-N, the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement's (SPLA/M) former northern

**Figure 11: Number of conflict events and fatalities in Sudan (excluding Darfur), January 2008 to December 2017 (UCDP GED)**



Source: UCDP GED, version 18.1.

branch that had started an armed rebellion against the inclusion of the two border states, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, in Sudan. Conflict events were hence concentrated in these areas (Map 2).<sup>61</sup>

There are also links to the war in Darfur, since in November 2011 the SPLM-N established a loose alliance with Darfuri rebels – the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), an anti-government rebel alliance that brought together the two main factions of the SLM/A, the Darfuri JEM and rebels in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states.<sup>62</sup>

From 2012 to 2016, however, battles accounted for a smaller share of overall violence, and remote violence in particular as well as violence


against civilians accounted for a bigger share (Figure 12).

Remote violence in the form of airstrikes carried out by the government mostly served to fight insurgencies in the Kordofan area and the Blue Nile on suspected rebel hideouts and civilian sympathisers.

Most of the violence against civilians occurred in these areas dominated by the SPLM-N to cut the rebel group's support base. In 2017 violence against civilians accounted for over 70% of overall violence in Sudan.


Data from ACLED and UCDP GED both show that the most important rebel group during the immediate post-independence period is the SPLM-N, and then the SRF.

Map 2: Conflict events in Sudan (excluding Darfur), 1997 to 2017




Source: UCDP GED, version 18.1.

**Figure 12: Share of overall violence per event type (battles, remote violence and violence against civilians) in Sudan (excluding Darfur), January 2003 to December 2017 (ACLED)**



Source: ACLED, version 8.

**Figure 13: Share of conflict events by actor type (state forces, rebels, militias, external forces) in Sudan (excluding Darfur), January 1997 to December 2017 (ACLED)**



Source: ACLED, version 8.

ACLED data per actor type indicates that between 2011 and 2017, the government forces of Sudan accounted for the greatest share of conflict events in Sudan (on average for about 36%), closely followed by rebel forces (about 32%) and ethnic and political militias (close to 6%) (Figure 13).

Sudan's post-CPA political order was still characterised by Khartoum crushing all political opponents with force

Both ACLED and UCDP GED data indicate that outside of Darfur the most active rebel group during the immediate post-independence period was the SPLM-N and thereafter the SRF.

In the immediate post-CPA period (2005–2007), militias accounted for a greater share of political violence than state or rebel forces. This changed in 2009 when armed conflict between the government and rebel forces was revived.

## South Sudan

### Brief conflict and peace process overview

The CPA signed on 9 January 2005 that formally ended the Second Sudanese Civil War between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A provided for a post-2005 confederate Sudan with significant autonomy for South Sudan. This included a separate army, a president, a secular state and a branch of the central bank.<sup>63</sup>

The CPA's provision for an independence referendum was the basis for South Sudan to become independent from Sudan on 9 July 2011 (Map 3). The SPLM became the ruling party of South Sudan under Kiir's leadership.

Since independence in 2011, South Sudan has had among the highest levels of reported fatalities in Africa.<sup>64</sup> According to the UN Refugee Agency, at the end of October 2018, there were more than two million refugees and asylum seekers from South Sudan representing more than a sixth of the country's population.<sup>65</sup> Investigations by the UN, the African

Union (AU) and others have documented repeated war crimes and crimes against humanity.<sup>66</sup>

Despite the fact that the CPA established the SPLM/A as the national governing and military body, it had been characterised by internal divisions and factionalism since the 1990s.<sup>67</sup> These divisions shaped the dynamics of political violence in South Sudan from independence, and Kiir's leadership was constantly being challenged.<sup>68</sup>

Khartoum's move to cut off South Sudan's oil production in 2012 further factionalised the SPLM and made it more difficult for Kiir to manage the internal divisions in South Sudan via the redistribution of rents.<sup>69</sup> In other words, 'the country's patronage system became unworkable' and 'fighting erupted after Kiir could no longer pay off his political rivals and moved to shut them out of the system'.<sup>70</sup>

A fracture within South Sudan's military and the targeted killing of Nuer<sup>71</sup> soldiers and civilians by elements of South Sudan's military by a Dinka component of Kiir's Presidential Guard in December 2013 in Juba triggered the start of the South Sudanese Civil War.

The two main protagonists were Kiir's government and what later became the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In-Opposition (SPLM-IO) led by Kiir's former deputy Riek Machar.<sup>72</sup> The fragile coalition of South Sudan's ethnic and politico-military elites had broken down.<sup>73</sup>

Since independence in 2011, South Sudan has had among the highest levels of reported fatalities in Africa

In August 2015, and under great external pressure, the two sides signed the ARCSS, a peace agreement that shared many key features with Sudan's CPA in that it had an exclusive focus on the two main conflict parties and moreover assumed that these were unified actors.<sup>74</sup> The deal was brokered by an 'IGAD-Plus' coalition comprising the AU Commission, UN, European Union (EU), Troika (United States, Great Britain and Norway), China, and an AU high-level committee including Nigeria, South Africa, Rwanda, Chad and Algeria.<sup>75</sup>

Map 3: South Sudan



Source: South Sudan, Map No. 4450 Rev. 1, UN, October 2011.

The peace agreement addresses the four dimensions of power sharing. One involves establishing a Transitional Government of National Unity between the SPLM and the SPLM-IO. The second is for federalism to be the system of governance in South Sudan.

Third is the partial demilitarisation of Juba and the gradual merging of the two rival forces into a single national force besides the formation of units of joint integrated police.

Fourth is allocating power over resources to the rebels by allowing them the privilege to nominate the governors of oil-rich Unity and Upper Nile states, a 40% stake in Greater Upper Nile's three states, and 15% in the other seven.<sup>76</sup>

But despite their formal pledge to peace, violent conflict has continued across South Sudan and the

ARCSS collapsed in July 2016. In September 2018, president Kiir and his major adversary, the former vice president and rebel leader Machar, signed a new peace agreement in Addis Ababa that restored the 2015 transitional power-sharing government.<sup>77</sup>

This agreement was preceded by various other failed attempts to revive the peace process, including the Khartoum Declaration of Agreement signed in Khartoum in June 2018.

Prospects for the 2018 deal to produce better results are highly uncertain. The new deal is very similar to that signed in 2015 in terms of its provisions.<sup>78</sup> It differs in that it has more support from South Sudanese elites, and is being enforced by the governments of Sudan and Uganda who have significant leverage.<sup>79</sup>

### Box 3: Implementation of ARCSS

According to analysis done by the Kroc Institute, the ARCSS agreement in South Sudan scored very poorly on implementation.<sup>80</sup>

By the end of 2015, the temporary power-sharing government and the monitoring group to oversee the implementation and ceasefire were only minimally implemented. At the time the deal collapsed in 2016, only 20 percent of its provisions had been implemented. This is significantly below the average completion score of 52 percent within two years post signature.<sup>81</sup>

Aly Verjee argues that the failure of the implementation of the peace agreement was a direct result of the fact that the government of South Sudan and the SPLM/IO rejected the demilitarisation foreseen in the draft peace agreement which included a specific number of troops allowed into Juba.<sup>82</sup>

### Trajectories of violence

Fatalities in South Sudan peaked initially following independence in 2011 (in August 2011 and in January 2012) although conflict activity overall was relatively low and stable. Most of the violence in 2011/12 involved rebel groups led by dissident generals (including David Yau Yau), alongside large raids conducted between Nuer clans (particularly the Lou Nuer) and Murle groups in the second half of 2011 and early 2012. These caused extraordinarily high numbers of fatalities.

According to ACLED more than 750 people died in August 2011, and more than 3 300 people in January 2012. Thereafter, fatalities receded to relatively low and stable levels. While UCDP GED records 700 fatalities for August 2011, its fatality count of 346 (best estimate) for the January 2012 events is significantly lower than those recorded by ACLED (based on reports from the Small Arms Survey).

As of July 2013, data from both datasets indicates a sharp increase in both number of conflict events and fatalities (Figures 14 and 15). This is when the power struggle within the ruling SPLM over the 2015 presidency culminated in Kiir dismissing his entire cabinet and Machar as vice president<sup>83</sup> as well as other opponents,

particularly those previously aligned with SPLM leader John Garang.<sup>84</sup>

Both datasets reflect the violent escalations of the divisions within the SPLA.<sup>85</sup> The ARCSS ignored that already before the independence referendum, the SPLM/A had different factions that were kept in place by the patronage system.<sup>86</sup> In fact, it had emerged from the Second Sudanese Civil War 'as a factionalised coalition'.<sup>87</sup>

In December 2013, Kiir's allied forces launched a campaign of political violence against Nuer in Juba that bred more violence (along ethnic lines) and according to ACLED led to more than 1 400 reported fatalities, including many civilians.

The ARCSS provision of a unity government to be followed by elections set incentives for violence

Violence spread from Juba to other parts of the country, and ACLED's total fatality count comes to more than 2 700 people killed during December 2013. UCDP GED's best estimate at over 1 500 for the same month is much more conservative.

Violence receded temporarily following the ceasefire of January 2014.<sup>88</sup> Nonetheless ACLED data in particular indicates that the number of conflict events and fatalities remained comparatively high until the signing of the August 2015 peace agreement.

### The peace agreement


The ARCSS led to Machar's reinstatement as vice president in a transitional government under Kiir.

The lack of commitment to the agreement's power-sharing provisions soon became obvious when Kiir's faction effectively reformulated the agreement according to their interests.

Partly, this served 'to encourage divisions among internal political critics, and oppose mounting pressures from international and regional powers (including the imposition of a UN Regional Protection Force in Juba)'.<sup>89</sup>

Kiir's government also manipulated the revenue-sharing system to allocate themselves two thirds of revenues

Figure 14: Number of conflict events and fatalities in South Sudan, July 2011 to December 2017 (ACLED)



Source: ACLED, version 8.

that were supposed to be equally split, through the Nile Petroleum Corporation.<sup>90</sup>

Political violence continued at similar levels after 2015 despite the peace agreement. There were two significant spikes in fatalities that nevertheless were much lower than the previous spikes that preceded the ceasefire in January 2014 and the peace agreement in August 2015 respectively.


The lack of demilitarisation of Juba was a violation of the principles of the peace deal, and allowed for an escalation of violence in 2016. The draft version of the deal included specific numbers of troops allowed into Juba, but these were removed at the insistence of the government and the SPLM-IO.<sup>91</sup>

The deal's transitional security provisions allowed for limited SPLA and SPLA-IO forces to take up position in Juba, but Kiir in particular built up both regular SPLA forces and militia fighters in and around Juba, and when Machar returned to the capital in April 2016 he was accompanied by SPLA-IO soldiers.<sup>92</sup>

The condition for a credible and neutral force from a third country to provide security in Juba, was abandoned, possibly at the insistence of regional powers.<sup>93</sup>

On 9 and 10 July, the SPLA pursued Machar and his SPLM-IO forces across Juba and into Western Equatoria, as they fled to the DRC. A ceasefire was declared on 11 July<sup>94</sup> which was violated in a day.

Figure 15: Number of conflict events and fatalities in South Sudan, August 2011 to December 2017 (UCDP GED)



Source: UCDP GED, version 18.1.

The fighting and atrocities against civilians in Juba triggered further retaliation and clashes across the country.<sup>95</sup>

After the ARCSS collapse, the war continued to spread ‘and metastasize into a deepening national crisis of ethnic and military fragmentation, shaped by new dynamics rooted in the failed peace efforts, with devastating and wide-reaching humanitarian consequences’.<sup>96</sup>


Eventually Kiir’s faction consolidated its power, split what remained of the political opposition and gained full military control of Juba. The government then shifted its focus to fight the reinvigorated SPLA-IO insurrection in Upper Nile,

the localised rebellions around Aweil and Wau, and the deteriorating security situation in government-controlled areas across Central and Western Equatoria.<sup>97</sup>

After the violence in July 2016, Machar was replaced as vice president by party rival Taban Deng Gai, formally splitting the opposition, which led to intra-SPLM-IO fighting in Upper Nile.

The trend in events and fatalities is consistent across ACLED and UCDP GED although ACLED records significantly more events than UCDP GED in the period under study.

**Figure 16: Share of total conflict events (battles, remote violence, violence against civilians) by event type in South Sudan, from July 2011 to December 2017 (ACLED)**



Source: ACLED, version 8.

From a geographical perspective, political violence in South Sudan has spread across the country between 2011 and 2017 (Map 4).<sup>98</sup> The ARCSS security provisions and the collapse of the agreement were an important factor for the spread of the war into Greater Equatoria after 2015, and the cantonment provisions were largely responsible for a surge in opposition mobilisation under the banner of the South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO).<sup>99</sup> Fighting also continued in Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity.

Map 4 further illustrates that violence levels have not reduced since the signing of the peace agreement.

Patterns of violence didn’t shift after the signing of the peace agreement. Battles and violence against civilians


(ACLED) and state-based and one-sided violence (UCDP GED) continue to account for the greatest share of political violence in South Sudan (Figure 16).

These two types of violence are connected insofar as Kiir’s forces and associated organised non-state actors would target the civilian support base of the rebel groups they’re fighting. Hence the parallel trend lines in the data.

In fact, the ‘multiple and interacting local and national level conflicts’ in South Sudan pose extraordinary high risks for civilians that are often targeted by both government and rebel forces as well as militias.<sup>100</sup>

Other conflicts include competition over local control and power, particularly in Jonglei between the Murle ethnic group and Lou Nuer and Dinka communities (Map 4).<sup>101</sup>

**Map 4: Conflict events in South Sudan, different periods in comparison**



Source: UCDP GED, version 18.1.

Most violence in South Sudan is perpetrated by state forces and SPLM-IO rebels (Figure 17). These are mobilised by the government and the opposition/rebel forces respectively. They reflect the ongoing struggle for power which illustrates that the ARCSS power-sharing agreement did not bear any fruit.

In fact, the peace agreement and the elections provision perpetuated the violent competition over access to power and resources between elites, and also deepened ethnic fault lines between Kiir's Dinka Bahr el Ghazal and Machar's Nuer factions.<sup>102</sup>


Alan Boswell concludes that: 'The [ARCSS] peace agreement was at odds with itself, structuring a

temporary return to a unity government to be followed by winner-take-all elections between its parts.'<sup>103</sup>

Since December 2013, there is no significant change in the types of actors engaged in violence before and after the peace agreement and for how much of the overall violence these actors account (Figure 17). According to ACLED, conflict events attributed to rebels have been increasing since the signing of the peace agreement.

Political militias account for a significantly smaller share of the political violence than rebel groups, but the trend lines for both roughly evolve in parallel. Ethnic and political militias each account for a similar share of

**Figure 17: Share of total conflict events (battles, remote violence, violence against civilians) in South Sudan by actor type, from July 2011 to December 2017 (ACLED)**



violence, and this hasn't changed much throughout the period under study.

A more disaggregated analysis of the non-state forces that are actively involved in conflict in South Sudan confirms that the SPLM-IO accounts for most of the political violence carried out by rebel groups.

ACLED also recorded more active rebel groups in South Sudan in the post-peace agreement period than in the period before. This reflects the increasingly factionalised and regionalised nature of the armed opposition.

## Conclusion

Despite ambitious peace interventions, Sudan and South Sudan are among the countries in Africa to have experienced the highest number of fatalities between 2011 and 2017.

This report asks whether the peace agreements in Sudan and South Sudan have resolved, reshaped or perpetuated existing patterns of political violence.

Overall, both the ACLED and the UCDP GED affirm each other's findings with regard to the trends in political violence in Sudan after the CPA and in South Sudan after the ARCSS.

Sudan's peace process that culminated in the CPA – an externally brokered deal of elite accommodation – put an end to a very long and deadly civil war between the government of Sudan in the north and the SPLM/A in the south. Its main merit is that the signatories did not return to war. Yet Sudan was not at peace after the CPA, and it still is not.

The run-up to the CPA's signing in 2005 and the years after were followed by a temporary 'negative peace' characterised by relatively low overall conflict activity and fatalities. This period lasted until the end of the CPA's six-year transition period which also marked the end of the UNMIS presence.

Nevertheless, the conflict parties continued to wage low-intensity war via proxies. The data also reveals that conflict events perpetrated by militias increased in the three years after the signing of the CPA.

The CPA resolved the civil war's core conflict issue of marginalisation via a transitory power-sharing arrangement between the government and the SPLM/A

and the secession referendum which resulted in South Sudan's independence in 2011.

By including only the main conflict parties at the negotiation table and leaving other actors and conflict systems unaddressed, the CPA arguably fuelled new grievances and conflict dynamics, most prominently in Darfur.

Conflict event data supports the view that the start of the insurgency in Darfur which saw extraordinary high fatalities in 2003 and 2004 is connected to the exclusion of Darfuri groups from the peace process. Waging an armed insurgency seemed the only route to more autonomy.

Both ACLED and UCDP GED event data indicates a considerable increase in the frequency of conflict events in Sudan between the end of the 2000s and 2016, although on average it was lower than during the period of the civil war that is captured by the data.

The structural drivers of violence cannot be ignored or traded off against geopolitics or short-term stability

The CPA and its implementation did little to incentivise fundamental changes to Sudan's political order – that is, to address the root causes of Sudan's complex conflict landscape. Instead, it reinforced a pattern of political violence in which Khartoum crushes all political opposition with force.

Finally, via the provision for the secession referendum the CPA laid the foundation for the independence of South Sudan in July 2011. South Sudan descended into civil war within two and a half years after independence.

The ARCSS peace agreement did not succeed to form a stable coalition between the elites with access to violence in South Sudan. Instead, it reinforced a political order based on violent competition over power and resources.

The provision of a unity government to be followed by elections in a 'winner-takes-all' context compounded incentives for political violence. After the ARCSS collapse, political violence spread across South Sudan.

The data shows that the perpetrators of violence essentially remained the same: government forces

versus SPLM/A-IO rebels, with both also relying on the support of ethnic and political militias.

The outright lack of commitment to the agreement that was particularly obvious in the parties' rejection of the proposal to demilitarise Juba, the poor implementation of the agreement, and an ongoing struggle for power among the signatories in a context characterised by a 'winner takes all' rationale, led to spoiler behaviour and conflict re-escalation in South Sudan. This was compounded by factionalism in both government and opposition.

The structural drivers of violence and instability cannot be ignored. If left unaddressed or traded off against geopolitics and/or short term stability, they are likely to spoil efforts to build peace in the medium and longer terms.

### Acknowledgements

Special thanks to Dan Watson, Remco Jansen, Amanda Lucey, Christine Bell and Jakkie Cilliers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the report. Thanks also to Andrea Carboni and Remco Jansen for support with data analysis.

## Annex

**Table 1: Sudan's peace agreement**

|   |   |
|---|---|
| <p>The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Sudan People's Liberation Movement – signed on 9 January 2005</p> | <p>A collection of previously agreed-on documents, with Chapter I comprising the Machakos Protocol, Chapter II the Protocol on Power Sharing, Chapter III the Framework Agreement on Wealth Sharing, Chapter IV the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict, Chapter V the Resolution of the Conflict in the Two States of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, Chapter VI incorporating the Agreements on Security Arrangements, and Annexure I incorporating the Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices. Annexure II establishes Implementation Modalities and a Global Implementation Matrix for the included agreements and protocols.</p> |
|---|---|

Source: <https://peaceagreements.org>

**Table 2: South Sudan's peace agreement**

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p>Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) – signed on 17 August 2015</p> | <p>A comprehensive agreement attempting to reconcile President Salva Kiir Mayardit and Riek Machar of the SPLM-IO. The agreement includes provisions on creating a unity government, a permanent ceasefire, provisions for humanitarian aid and reconstruction, economic and financial arrangements, arrangements for transitional justice, accountability, reconciliation and healing, the parameters of permanent constitution, the establishment of a Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and implementation procedures.</p> |
|--|--|

Source: <https://peaceagreements.org>

## Notes

- 1 World Bank and United Nations, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, March 2018, 144.
- 2 There is no consensus in the literature as to what a political settlement is. For a summary of the debate see C Bell and J Pospisil, Navigating Inclusion in Transitions from Conflict: The Formalised Political Unsettlement, *Journal of International Development*, 29:5 (2017); Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2017/04, 10 February 2017.
- 3 JK Westendorf, *Why Peace Processes Fail: Negotiating Insecurity After Civil War*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2015, 19–20.
- 4 On the concept of 'positive peace' versus 'negative peace', see J Galtung, Violence, war and their impact on visible and invisible effects of violence, *Forum for Intercultural Philosophy*, 2004, <http://them.polylog.org/5/fgj-en.htm>.
- 5 JK Westendorf, *Why Peace Processes Fail: Negotiating Insecurity After Civil War*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2015, 17.
- 6 C Bell, *Navigating Inclusion in Peace Settlements, Human Rights and the Creation of the Common Good*. London: British Academy, 2017; C Bell and J Pospisil, *Negotiating Inclusion in Transitions from Conflict: The Formalised Political Unsettlement*, Research Paper 2017/04, Edinburgh School of Law, Edinburgh, 2017; see also C Sriram and M Zahar, The Perils of Power-Sharing: Africa and Beyond. *Africa Spectrum* 44, No. 3: 11–39, 2009.
- 7 See also C Hartzell and A Mehler (eds.), *Power-Sharing and Power Relations*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2018, 2, drawing on A Mehler, Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not So Obvious Relationship, *African Affairs*, Vol. 108, Issue 432, pp. 453–473, 2009 and others; for the case of Sudan's CPA specifically see also J Brosché, *Sharing Power – Enabling Peace? Evaluating Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005*, Uppsala University, 2009: 33.
- 8 Why South Sudanese adversaries signed a peace deal that they do not want, *The Conversation*, <https://theconversation.com/why-south-sudanese-adversaries-signed-a-peace-deal-that-they-do-not-want-46940>, 3 September 2015.
- 9 M Joshi and JM Quinn, Implementing the Peace: The Aggregate Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements and Peace Duration after Intrastate Armed Conflict, *British Journal of Political Science*, 47 What are the prospects for South Sudan's new peace agreement?, Kroc Institute, 29 October 2018, <https://kroc.nd.edu/news-events/news/what-are-the-prospects-for-south-sudans-new-peace-agreement/.869>.
- 10 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between The Government of The Republic of The Sudan and The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Sudan People's Liberation Army, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/SudanCPA.pdf>.
- 11 C Raleigh, A Linke, H Hegre and J Karlsen, Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset, *Journal of Peace Research* 47(5), 651–660, 2010.
- 12 R Sundberg and E Melander, Introducing the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Georeferenced Event Dataset, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 50, No. 4, 2013, 523–532; M Croicu and R Sundberg, UCDP GED Codebook version 18.1, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2017.
- 13 See, for example, the OECD's States of Fragility 2016: Understanding Violence report; C Aucoin, Less armed conflict but more political violence in Africa: Conflict data sources show fewer armed conflicts, but are we getting the full picture?, *ISS Today*, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/less-armed-conflict-but-more-political-violence-in-africa>.
- 14 J Cilliers and J Schünemann, The future of intrastate conflict in Africa: More violence or greater peace?, 15 May 2013, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper246.pdf>; J Cilliers and S Hedden, Africa's current and future stability, ISS, 20 November 2014, <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper274V2.pdf>; J Cilliers and TD Sisk, Assessing long-term state fragility in Africa: Prospects for 26 'more fragile' countries, ISS, 2016, <https://issafrica.org/research/monographs/assessing-long-term-state-fragility-in-africa-prospects-for-26-more-fragile-countries>; J Cilliers, Africa's conflict burden in a global context, ISS, 22 October 2014, <https://issafrica.org/research/papers/africas-conflict-burden-in-a-global-context>; J Cilliers, Violence in Africa: trends, drivers and prospects to 2023, *Africa Report* 12, August 2018, <https://issafrica.org/research/africa-report/violence-in-africa-trends-drivers-and-prospects-to-2023>.
- 15 The Political Settlements Research Programme is concerned with how political settlements can be made both more stable and more inclusive of those affected by them beyond political elites. The focus is on conflict and the attempts to resolve it through peace processes. Find out more at [www.politicalsettlements.org](http://www.politicalsettlements.org).
- 16 Thanks to Daniel Watson from the University of Sussex for this contribution.
- 17 According to the Kroc Institute, agreements can be considered comprehensive when the major parties to the conflict were involved in the negotiations that led to the written agreement, and when the substantive issues underlying the conflict were included in the negotiations. See Peace Accords Matrix (PAM), <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/about>, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, accessed on 19 November 2018. Sudan's CPA is considered comprehensive by PAM. South Sudan's ARCSS is not.
- 18 P Wight, South Sudan and the Four Dimensions of Power-Sharing: Political, Territorial, Military, and Economic, in *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 2017, 1–35.
- 19 J Cilliers, Violence in Africa: trends, drivers and prospects to 2023, *Africa Report* 12, August 2018, <https://issafrica.org/research/africa-report/violence-in-africa-trends-drivers-and-prospects-to-2023>.
- 20 'Events data break down armed conflict into the basic interactions between parties. Each event constitutes an observation, and so each armed conflict can produce thousands of individual events.' K Eck, In data we trust? A comparison of UCDP GED and ACLED conflict events datasets, *Cooperation and Conflict* COOP CONFL. 47., 2012, 124–141, 3.
- 21 For a comprehensive comparison and critique of the two datasets see K Eck, In data we trust? A comparison of UCDP GED and ACLED conflict events datasets, in *Cooperation and Conflict*, 47(1), 124–141, 2012.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 In fact, no dataset will ever be able to provide analysts with a comprehensive picture of organised political violence in a specific country. It can be considered a given that there is significant under-reporting of violence from Sudan and South Sudan, and the extremely fluid conflict realities mean that they are particularly challenging environments for data collection and verification.
- 24 See ACLED codebook on fatalities: 'ACLED only codes estimated casualties when reported by source materials. It cannot verify the


- numbers reported from sources and does not use fatalities as the basis for event inclusion. Very often, no fatality information is available for events from sources and such reported fatality totals are often erroneous, as the numbers tend to be biased upward. If reported in a source or several sources, the number (or estimated number if several sources report various totals) is found in the fatalities column. If source reports differ or a vague estimate is provided, the lowest number of fatalities is reported. However, if reports mention several, many, or plural “civilians” and “unknown” and no other reference, “10” is recorded as the total. If a report mentions dozens, this is recorded as “12”. If a report mentions hundreds, this is recorded as “100”. If a note mentions “massacres”, a default number of 100 fatalities is recorded. If summarized fatalities are reported, but events occur across several days or in multiple locations simultaneously, the total number is divided and that fraction is recorded for each day of the event (if over 1). If an odd number, the proportion of fatalities is divided by assigning the first day the additional fatality and distributed as evenly as possible. No information for number of harmed people is recorded in any other space besides the notes column, if available.’ See ACLED, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, Version 8, 2017, 29.
- 25 ACLED, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, Version 8, 2017, 6.
- 26 Remote violence refers to events in which the tool for engaging in conflict didn’t require the physical presence of the perpetrator. As per ACLED’s codebook, the main characteristic of a remote violence event is that a spatially removed group determines the time, place and victims of the attack. These include bombings, improvised explosive device attacks, mortar and missile attacks, etc. Remote violence can be waged on both armed agents (e.g. an active rebel group; a military garrison) and civilians (e.g. a roadside bombing). ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, Version 8, 2017, 7.
- 27 ACLED, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, Version 8, 2017.
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